Abstract: Beliefs specified for predicting an unobserved realization of pivotal variables in the context of the fiducial and Dempster-Shafer (DS) inference can be weakened for credible inference. We consider predictive random sets for predicting an unobserved random sample from a known distribution, e.g., the uniform distribution U (0, 1). More specifically, we choose our beliefs for inference in two steps: (i) define a class of weak beliefs in terms of DS models for predicting an unobserved sample, and (ii) seek a belief within that class to balance the trade-off between credibility and efficiency of the resulting DS inference. We call this approach the Maximal Belief (MB) method. The MB method is illustrated with two examples:
Introduction
R. A. Fisher introduced the fiducial argument in his paper "Inverse Probability" in 1930 in an attempt to derive posterior distributions for unknown parameters without using Bayesian priors. Since then, the fiducial argument has been a subject full of discussion and controversy. To many contemporary statisticians, "fiducial inference stands as Fisher's one great failure" (Zabell (1992) ).
To a few statisticians, however, Fisher's attitude toward statistical inference from the late 1920's to late 1950's is a key to understand inference. This has inspired continuing efforts to understand the implications of the fiducial argument for scientific inference (e.g., Dempster (1966) , Fraser (1966) , Dawid and Stone (1982) , Wang (2000) , to name a few). Hannig et al (2006, 2007, and references therein) is a good introduction to recent activities on fiducial inference.
The basic idea of fiducial inference can be illustrated by the problem of inferring the unknown mean µ in the Gaussian model X|µ ∼ N (µ, 1) (µ ∈ R = (−∞, ∞)) from a single observation X. For fiducial inference, we write X = µ + Z, where Z ∼ N (0, 1) a priori and is called a pivotal variable. We obtain the fiducial posterior µ|X ∼ N (X, 1) by predicting Z * = X − µ, the unobserved value Z,
with Z ∼ N (0, 1). It is well known that fiducial inference is well calibrated for certain assertions about µ such as A = {µ ≤ 0}. Unfortunately, the fiducial inference is not in general well calibrated (Zabell, 1992) , indicating that the conventional beliefs are too strong. Dempster (1966) extended the fiducial argument to cases with multinomial observable variables. The work of Dempster in 1960s and G. Shafer (1976) leads to a new inferential method known as the Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of belief functions. Recently, Dempster (2008) introduced a convenient formulation of DS output in terms of (p, q, r) , where p expresses the probability for the truth of an assertion, q expresses the probability against the truth of the assertion, and r represents a residual probability of the new category of "don't know", an important component that is needed in scientific inference and has been missing in other existing inferential theories.
DS theory can be viewed as a successor to Fisher's fiducial inference. Consider the following equation that defines a parametric sampling model for the observed data X with parameter θ, X = a(θ, U ) (X ∈ X , θ ∈ Θ, U ∼ U ([0, 1] n )) (1.1)
where U ([0, 1] n ) denotes the uniform distribution in the n-dimensional cube [0, 1] n , but can be replaced with any fixed distribution for generality. The setting (1.1) is the familiar one for Fisher's fiducial argument, e.g., in the context of the functional models of Bunke (1975) and Dawid and Stone (1982) and the structural inference of Fraser (1961 Fraser ( , 1968 . Since (1.1) is merely a device made in practice for subjective inference, we call the variable U the auxiliary variable and the equation (1.1) the auxiliary (a)-equation. To call attention to the difference between (1.1) and the setting for fiducial inference, we note that (i) X = a(θ, U )
can be a multi-valued mapping, and (ii) X is the whole sample of data, rather than (minimal) sufficient statistics that is required by the Fisher's fiducial argument. When a(θ, U ) is multi-valued, the inverse mapping for obtaining θ given X and U results in the set θ(X, U ) = {θ : X = a(θ, U ), θ ∈ Θ}.
In this case, we "don't know" the exact value of θ in θ(X, U ). Hannig (2006) discussed the use of multi-valued mappings in the context of generalized fiducial intervals, where "don't know" is removed by taking θ to be a single point in θ(X, U ). On the contrary, we propose to enlarge θ(X, U ), e.g., by smearing U over a neighborhood, enough for credible inference.
Our proposed method is a modification of the conventional DS analysis:
As with DS (see Section 2.3), we assume that the true data-generating process follows a-equation (1.1) with unknown θ and unobserved U . Unlike conventional DS, our posterior is obtained by replacing each random draw of U from U ([0, 1] n ) with an expanded set S(U ) and using the enlarged random set θ(X, S(U )) = {θ : X = a(θ, u), u ∈ S(U )} = u∈S(U ) θ(X, U )
for inference about θ, where S(U ) is a mapping that maps each point U in [0, 1] n to a subset of [0, 1] n . The use of the expanded set S(U ) also avoids the technical challenging problem that occurs when Pr (θ(X, U ) = ∅) = 0; see Dempster (1963) . The resulting belief is weaker than the conventional DS belief and is called a weak belief (WB).
For credible and efficient inference, we choose a belief S(U ), called a maximal belief (MB), in two steps: (i) define a class of weak beliefs for the prediction of U * , and (ii) seek a belief that balances the trade-off between credibility and efficiency. In other words, the MB is the belief within the WB class that is just weak enough for credible inference. The idea of MB, along with the concepts of credibility and efficiency, is explained further in Section 3. Although we consider here only one ad hoc class of WBs for defining the MB, the illustrative examples show that the method is promising for credible DS inference.
The remainder of this article is arranged as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the ideas from DS theory. Section 3 defines credibility and weak beliefs and describes the basic idea of MB. Section 4 presents a specific class of weak beliefs for predicting the unobserved U in model (1.1). Section 5 illustrates the method of MB with two examples. Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion.
The DS Theory: A Brief Introduction
The reader is referred to Dempster (2008) for details of the framework of modern DS analysis. What is needed for this paper is the fact that the conditional DS posterior of θ given X with (1.1) is characterized by the random set
assuming, hereafter, Pr (θ(X, U ) = ∅) > 0 holds for DS models (DSMs). For any assertion A about θ, for example, A is represented as a subset of Θ. The DS (p, q, r) output for A is computed as follows
where U ∼ U ([0, 1] n ), A = Θ \ A, and the denominator Pr (K X (U ) = ∅) in the expressions of p and q reflects that fact that the conflict cases K X (U ) = ∅ need to be ruled out.
For readers who are interested in illustrative examples and a formal DS justification of this posterior, we discuss a simple example in Section 2.1 from the fiducial perspective to help understand basic DS models (BDSMs) described in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we show how BDSMs can be formulated from a-equations.
A DSM for a single dichotomous observation
Let X be a dichotomous observation with X ∈ X = {0, 1}. Suppose that the Bernoulli model Bernoulli(θ) Pr (X = 1|θ) = θ and Pr (X = 0|θ) = 1 − θ (2.2) with unknown θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1] is considered to generate the observed data X. The problem is to infer θ from X. We use the following a-equation for the "real-world" quantities X and θ with an auxiliary random variable U :
It follows that the sampling distribution of X given θ derived from this a-equation
is the same as that in (2.2).
Taking (2.3) as the data-generation model, to infer θ we extend the fiducial argument for continuous-data cases to this discrete-data case. That is, we obtain the posterior of θ by continuing to believe that U ∼ U (0, 1), a posteriori. Such a fiducial argument is in essence to predict U * , the unobserved true value of U associated with X, with a random draw U from U (0, 1). The distribution of the random draw U , U (0, 1), represents our uncertainty about U * and, thereby, about θ through the point-to-set mapping:
Thus, the posterior distribution of θ is determined by the random interval K X (U )
with U ∼ U (0, 1).
In DSM, the variable U serves as an auxiliary tool that leads to specifying a collection of subsets, called focal elements (Shafer, 1976) , in the product space X × Θ of (X, θ) and defining a (personal) probability measure on the collection of focal elements. More specifically, the set of focal elements include all intervals of the form
and the probability measure on the space of K(U ) is the push-forward measure, induced from U ∼ U (0, 1) . Formal DS treatment of deriving both the sampling distribution of X given θ and the posterior distribution of θ given X for the DSM is discussed in Section 2.2.
Basic DSM (BDSMs)
Suppose that the observed data and the unknown quantities of interest are denoted by X and θ, where X ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ. DS analysis starts with the state space model (SSM):
As is shown in the Bernoulli example of Section 2.1, the next step for DS analysis is to define a BDSM that is best described by the following two steps (A. P.
Dempster, personal communication):
(a) Specify the focal elements, which are subsets of the SSM, E ⊆ {K : K ⊆ X × Θ}, with a corresponding σ-field that will carry the probability measure, and (b) Specify a measure on E.
It is shown in Section 2.3 that BDSMs can be obtained from a-equations, as is typically if not always the case in conventional DS analysis. In this case, the probability measure on the focal element space is well defined and is derived from that of the auxiliary variable.
We use the Bernoulli model of Section 2.1 to illustrate this process of specifying a BDSM. The state space model is
The BDSM is then Deriving the sampling distribution of X given θ amounts to representing the known information about θ by a DSM and combining the two DSMs under the DS independence assumption on the two pieces of evidence. The information that θ is known (and X is unknown) is represented by the DSM that has the single focal element {(1, θ), (0, θ)} ⊆ X × Θ. The random set of the combined DSM is obtained, by applying Dempster's rule of combination, as the intersection of the subset {(1, θ), (0, θ)} and the random set K(U ). Hence, the random set of the combined DSM can be written as
DS marginalization, that is, projecting the random set (2.7) onto the space of X, gives the sampling distribution Bernoulli(θ) for X. This confirms that the sampling model is consistent with the usual Bernoulli(θ) for the observed data X. Similarly, combining the BDSM with the DSM representing the observed data X, which has the single focal element {(X, θ) : 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1}, produces the posterior DSM for θ with the focal element of the form [U, 1] for X = 1, and [0, U ] for X = 0 (2.8)
The induced measure is determined by U ∼ U(0, 1).
To illustrate the DS (p, q, r) output, consider the assertion A = {θ ≤ θ 0 } for a fixed θ 0 . Given X = 1, for example, we have the random interval [U, 1] for θ with U ∼ U (0, 1). There are two possible cases: (i) the case of U > θ 0 , which provides evidence against the truth of A, and (ii) the case of U ≤ θ 0 , which does not have any information about the truth or false of A. Note that there are no realizations of the random interval that provide evidence for the truth of A. As a result, the output has the following (p, q, r) components
for the assertion A = {θ ≤ θ 0 }.
Building BDSMs from sampling models
A-equation (1.1) defines an auxiliary data-generating process and therefore specifies the parametric sampling model for the observed data X. Here we show how to define a BDSM based on a-equation (1.1).
The SSM is defined to be the product space of the sampling space of X and the parameter space of θ, that is,
According to the two-step procedure of defining a BDSM, we have the following two steps of specifying the BDSM.
(a) The focal elements. For each U ∈ [0, 1] n , let
the collection of points in the SSM that satisfy the a-equation X = a(θ, U ).
Take all such subsets K(U ) as the focal elements. This completes the specification of the focal element space E = {K(U ) :
defined in (2.10).
(b) The measure on E. The measure on E is induced by the mapping K = K(U ) from [0, 1] n to E and the probability distribution of U ∼ U ([0, 1] n ).
As illustrated for the Bernoulli example in Section 2.2, it follows from routine DS calculus that the posterior DSM for θ is determined by the random set
where U X is assumed to be a measurable set in [0, 1] n with respect to U ([0, 1] n ).
Example 2.1 In this example, we consider the simple Gaussian model with the a-equation
where Φ −1 (.) stands for the inverse CDF of the standard normal distribution
That is, the sampling model is X ∼ N (µ, 1) with unknown µ ∈ R. This is the Gaussian example in Section 1 where Z = Φ(U ) is the pivotal variable.
The SSM is the product space R × R for (X, µ). The focal elements are the
, and hence
The measure is defined by taking U ∼ U (0, 1).
As in the Bernoulli example, routine application of DS calculus leads to the following results: (i) the sampling distribution of X given µ is N (µ, 1), and (ii) the posterior DSM for µ given X is the usual fiducial posterior µ|X ∼ N (X, 1).
Frequentist evaluation of this posterior distribution is given in Section 3.1.
Weak and Maximal Beliefs
Suppose that the a-equation (1.1) is considered for making inference about an unknown θ given the observed data X. In addition, assume that given the observed data X and a-equation (1.1), we are interested in making inference about an assertion A, which is a subset of X × Θ. We denote by A the denial of A, that is, A = X × Θ \ A. Our task is to produce DS assessments (p, q, r)
for the assertion A. It is clear that hypothesis testing problems are represented by assertions. We note that it is sufficient to consider inference in terms of assertions because posterior probability distributions are fully characterized by the probabilities of all measurable subsets.
Credibility: a frequentist evaluation
As with any posterior distribution-based inference, the performance of DS inference can be evaluated via frequentist evaluation. We adopt frequentist evaluation on the p and q components of DS (p, q, r) for the assertion A because the probability of "don't know" r protects us from making aggressive, but wrong decisions. Frequentist evaluation is based on hypothetical repeated experiments.
For evaluating the p and q components we consider such repeated experiments by taking X as a random variable generated under the truth of A or A. Thus, frequentist evaluation of (p, q, r) for A amounts to treating p = Pr ( An idea of defining credibility is to stochastically bound these large values. This motivates us to introduce the following definition of credibility of DS inference.
Definition 3.1 Given α ∈ (0, 1), the DS (p, q, r) output for an assertion A is said to be credible at α-level iff p and q satisfy the following long-run frequency properties:
and
The probability Pr p ≥ 1 − α | A in (3.1) is the long-run probability that p is larger than or equal to 1 − α under the condition that A is true in re-peated experiments with data generated from a-equation (1.1). The probability
2) is interpreted similarly. To explain the definition of credibility, we consider the following simple solution to the problem of choosing A, A, or neither, given the observed data X. Take a small value α, e.g., α = 0.05, and choose A if p > 1 − α, A if q > 1 − α, and neither A nor A otherwise. It follows that if the (p, q, r) is credible at α-level, we would make wrong choices at most α × 100% of the times. A familiar such example is the precise/sharp hypothesis problem. Incidentally, we note that the above definition of credibility is related to the fundamental frequentist principle of Walley (2002) .
Example 3.1 Consider the Gaussian model N (µ, 1) with unknown mean µ in Example 2.1 for a single observation X. Example 2.1 showed that our DSM for inference about µ is the familiar fiducial posterior, i.e., µ|X ∼ N (X, 1). Here we consider two types of assertions (i) A 1 (µ 0 ) = {µ ≤ µ 0 } for fixed µ 0 , and (ii)
where Φ(.) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1). For any α ∈ (0, 1), we have
and similarly Pr (q ≥ 1 − α|A 1 (µ 0 )) ≤ α. Thus, according to Definition 3.1 the fiducial inference about A 1 (µ 0 ) = {µ ≤ µ 0 } is credible for all α ∈ (0, 1).
For A 2 (µ 0 , δ) = {µ 0 − δ ≤ µ ≤ µ 0 + δ}, the DS (p, q, r) has the following components:
It follows that for δ ≈ 0 and α ∈ (0, 1),
This result shows that the fiducial inference about the assertion A 2 (µ 0 , δ) with a small δ is not credible. In the following section, we propose a way of building modified DSMs for credible inference.
Weakening conventional beliefs: an example
The posterior DSM for inference about the unknown parameter µ in the Gaussian model N (µ, 1) from a single observation X may not be credible. This indicates that the belief specified to derive the posterior DSM is too strong for certain assertions. To take a closer look at what that belief is, assume that the observation X was indeed generated according to a-equation (2.12), i.e.,
by taking a draw U * from U (0, 1). That is, the unobserved quantity U * follows U (0, 1) a priori. The fiducial posterior µ|X ∼ N (X, 1) can be viewed as obtained from a-equation (3.3) by predicting the unobserved true value U * with a random draw U from U (0, 1). To distinguish the role of the auxiliary variable in posterior inference from that in data generation, we call the auxiliary variable for posterior inference, such as the random variable U , the predictive random variable (PRV) and the auxiliary variable for data generation the generative random variable (GRV). The belief used in both the fiducial argument and traditional DS formulation for posterior inference is specified by assigning the distribution of the GRV to the PRV. We refer to this type of belief as the conventional belief (CB).
For credible DS inference with the Gaussian model, we propose to weaken the CB. One way of doing this is to expand U into an interval, denoted by S(U ).
Thus, given a posterior draw of U from U (0, 1), the belief that U * = U in the CB becomes the weak belief that U * ∈ S(U ). To illustrate the idea, we enlarge the PRV U into the following random interval
to predict U * = Φ(X − µ). Note that U ∈ S(U ). Our modification of the traditional posterior DSM produces the posterior DSM with the following random set
for U * = Φ(X − µ) and, thereby, the random set
for µ, where U ∼ U (0, 1). To investigate the credibility of this modified DSM for inference about the sharp assertion A 2 (µ 0 , 0) = {µ = µ 0 }, for which the traditional DSM is not credible, we now have the following DS (p, q, r) output:
and r = 1 − q because we have evidence against the assertion {µ = µ 0 } when µ 0 / ∈ S X (U ) and "don't know" otherwise. Thus, the long-run frequency distribution of q, as a function of X, is the uniform on the interval
for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the weak belief specified by (3.4) leads to a modified posterior DSM that is credible for the assertion {µ = µ 0 } with any fixed µ 0 in
A formal definition of weak belief is given in Section 3.3. The particular choice of the above random interval is related to the concept of maximal belief of Section 3.4 and discussed further in Section 4.
Weak beliefs
For building credible DSMs, we consider beliefs that are weaker than the conventional belief. For conceptual clarity, we have the following definition.
Definition 3.2 Denote by B and B ′ two DSMs on a common SSM X × Θ. The DSM B is said to be weaker than the DSM B ′ if for any assertion A ⊆ X × Θ, the probability for A under B, p = Pr (A|B), is smaller than or equal to the probability for A under B, p ′ = Pr (A|B ′ ).
For convenience, a belief is said to be weak if it is weaker than the corresponding conventional belief. Weak beliefs can be interpreted from different perspectives, which are summarized into the following propositions, where all DSMs are assumed to be on a common SSM X × Θ. Proposition 3.1 serves as an alternative definition in terms of random sets. Proposition 3.2 implies that weaker DSMs have a higher probability of "don't know". Proposition 3.3 provides a sufficient condition for comparing the weakness of two beliefs and suggests a way of creating weaker beliefs. The proofs of these results are straightforward and therefore omitted here to save space. Let U * be the true value that corresponds to the observed data X via the a-equation X = a(θ, U * ). Let B 0 denote the conventional belief for predicting U * . To weaken B 0 , we make use of Proposition 3.3 and replace each PRV U with a subset S(U ) of [0, 1] n containing U , i.e., U ∈ S(U ). Accordingly, the posterior DSM for θ given X (2.11) becomes the weak DSM that has the random set
Weak beliefs constructed this way are not unique. Assuming a class of such weak beliefs of interest is available, we can seek a particular belief within the class to balance between credibility and efficiency. This is discussed in the following section.
The method of maximal belief
Suppose that a class of weak beliefs for predicting U * , (U * ∈ [0, 1] n ), can be written as
where each B w stands for a belief with the index w in the index set W . A particular class of weak beliefs is proposed in Section 4. Here we consider choosing a B w from the class B for inference. Since our way of constructing weak beliefs is based on predicting U * , we shall consider credibility and efficiency of beliefs in predicting the unobserved U * that is assumed to follow U ([0, 1] n ).
Let S w be the random set of the DSM B w ∈ B. We write S w ∼ B w and call the random set S w the predictive random set (PRS). The corresponding random set for θ is
The DS (p, q, r) output for any assertion A is thus given by 9) where the random set θ(X, S w ) is given in (3.8).
Weak beliefs lead to inference that is more conservative than the CB, resulting in possible loss of efficiency. Thus, choosing B w for inference is practically important. Here we propose a method that is based on the long-run frequency of the probability that S w covers the unobserved U * .
Let U * be a point in [0, 1] n and let q w (U * ) be the probability that the PRS
The long-run frequency distribution of q w (U * ) is the distribution obtained by letting U * ∼ U ([0, 1] n ). For CBs, it holds almost surely that q w (U * ) = 1. For credible inference, we want to bound the frequency of large values of q w (U * ).
This motivates us to consider the following definition of credibility of beliefs for predicting U * :
Definition 3.3 Given α ∈ (0, 1), a belief B w ∈ B for predicting U * is said to be credible at level α iff
where
Notice that the probability that the PRS S w covers U * can be written as Pr (U * ∈ S w ) = 1 − Pr (U * / ∈ S w ) = 1 − q w (U * ). Take α = 0.05 and assume B w is credible at 0.05-level. Then
That is, in the long run for at least 95% of the realizations of U * the probability that the PRS S w covers U * is at least 5%, where U * and U are independent of each other with both U and U * following U ([0, 1] n ).
Among all beliefs that are credible at level α, some can be more efficient than others. In general, the smaller the coverage probability Pr (U * ∈ S w ) of the PRS, the more efficient the belief. Since
we prefer the credible belief that has the minimum value of Pr (Pr (U * ∈ S w ) > α)
or maximum value of Pr (Pr (U * / ∈ S w ) ≥ 1 − α). This leads to the following definition of the maximal belief (MB) at level α with respect to the class B:
Definition 3.4 Let B α be the subset of B consisting of the beliefs that are credible at level α, i.e.,
A belief B m ∈ B α (B α = ∅) is said to be the maximal belief at level α with respect to the class B iff
The MB-DS (p, q, r) for any assertion is obtained from (3.9) with S w ∼ B w replaced by S m ∼ B m . It is clear from this definition that if a belief B m satisfies Pr (q m (U * ) ≥ 1 − α) = α then B m is the MB. This is illustrated in Section 4.
We note that the maximal belief discussed above is based on predicting U * and thus can be viewed as a general-purpose belief that is expected to produce credible inference for any assertion of interest and to be efficient for some assertions such as those related to sharp hypothesis problems when the mapping θ = θ(X, U ) between θ and U is one-to-one given X. In Section 3.5, we adopt the idea of MB to define assertion-specific efficient beliefs.
Assertion-specific MBs
Each belief B w in (3.7) has the PRS S w for predicting U * . For a particular assertion of interest A, it may not require the PRV U (or S w ) as a "guesstimate"
of U * to be accurate for our (p, q, r) to be credible; consider, for example, the assertion {µ ≤ µ 0 } in the Gaussian model X ∼ N (µ, 1) with the observed data X. Thus, we can find a B w such that it is both credible and efficient with respect to inference about A. Let U = [0, 1] n and denote by U A and U A the collection of points in U that support the truth of A and A respectively, i.e., U A = {u : u ∈ U and X = a(θ, u) for some θ ∈ A} (3.13) and U A = {u : u ∈ U and X = a(θ, u) for some θ ∈ A} (3.14)
Let U X be the collection of points in U that are consistent with the observed data X, i.e., U X = {u : u ∈ U and X = a(θ, u) for some θ ∈ Θ} (3.15)
Then U \ U X consists of conflict cases and the (p, q, r) output for A based on B w is computed as follows:
where U A , U A , and U X are defined in (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15).
Extending the idea of MB in Section 3.4, we can define the maximal belief for A at level α, with respect to B, to be the belief that has the maximum value of Pr p ≥ 1 − α|A or Pr (q ≥ 1 − α|A) among all the credible beliefs in B for the assertion of interest A according to Definition 3.1, i.e.,
Pr p ≥ 1 − α|A ≤ α and Pr (q ≥ 1 − α|A) ≤ α.
The probabilities p and q are given in (3.16) and they are random variables in the hypothetical repeated experiments that are used to establish the long-run properties of WB-based modification of DS.
A Class of Predictive DSMs for Uniform Samples
Weak beliefs can be obtained by replacing the PRV U of CB with a PRS S(U ) that is a subset containing U or a neighborhood of U . While more study is expected to be done on how to construct such PRSs, in this section we present a (ad hoc) class of PRSs for predicting an unobserved sample from the uniform distribution U (0, 1). The corresponding class of weak beliefs is used in Section 5 to illustrate the proposed MB method.
A class of predictive DSMs for a single uniform random variable
For each point U in [0, 1], we consider the subset of the form
Let U ∼ U (0, 1). Then we have a class of beliefs indexed by w ∈ [0, 1]:
where the belief B w has the random set S w (U ). Note that the interval length of S w (U ) is w. Thus, B 0 (U ) is the CB used for fiducial inference while B 1 (U )
represents the vacuous belief that has the entire space as the single focal element.
It is shown in the following theorem that the MB for any level α is B 1/2 , which has the random set
Theorem 1 Denote by δ a the degenerated distribution with probability mass 1 at a. Let U * ∼ U (0, 1). Then for
with U * ∼ U (0, 1), S w = S w (U ), and U ∼ U (0, 1)),
(1) P * ∼ U (0, 1) for w = 1/2, (2) P * ∼ (2w − 1)δ 0 + 2(1 − w)U (0, 1) for w > 1/2, and
Proof. Note that the random interval for predicting U is [(1 − w)U, (1 − w)U + w]. Thus, given U ∼ U (0, 1) we have
The result in (1) follows from the fact that, in the case of w = 1/2, P * = 1 − Q * = 1 − 2U * for U * ≤ 1/2, and 2U * − 1 for U * > 1/2. For the result in (2) for P * = 1 − Q * , we have
In the w < 1/2 case for P * = 1 − Q * , we have
Thus, the result in (3) follows.
Example 4.1 Consider again the Gaussian example of Section 3.2 where a single observation X from N (µ, 1) with unknown mean µ. Here we conclude this "running" example with some numerical results. The random interval for µ from DSM(w) can be written as
This means that given a draw of R X (U ) from B w , we have
and have no further information about the exact location of µ within R X (U ).
With the MB B 1/2 , we compute the DS (p, q, r) for the assertion A µ 0 (µ) = {µ = µ 0 } where µ 0 ∈ R is fixed. The probability p for the truth of A µ 0 is 0 due to the fact that Pr X − Φ −1 (U + w) = X − Φ −1 (U ) = µ 0 = 0. The probability q against the truth of A µ 0 is the probability that the random interval does not contain µ 0 , obtained in Section 3.2,
The residual probability r is then r = 1 − p − q. For example, for µ 0 = 0 with the observed X = 0 we have (p, q, r) = (0, 0, 1), which indicates no evidence for or against the truth of the assertion that µ = 0. For µ 0 = 0 with the observed X = 2
we have (p, q, r) = (0, 0.95, 0.05), which shows evidence with q = 95% against the truth of the assertion that µ = 0. This demonstrates a nice DS way of resolving the problem of significance testing with the null hypothesis H 0 : µ = 0 and the alternative hypothesis H a : µ = 0. DS (p, q, r) outputs for other assertions, e.g., {µ ≤ 0}, can also be computed similarly.
A class of predictive DSMs for ordered uniforms
For a uniform sample U 1 , ..., U n , we write their ordered values as
A draw of U (1) , ..., U (n) from the BDSM for U (1) , ..., U (n) can be obtained by taking a sample of n from U (0, 1) and sorting the sample in ascending order to create U (1) , ..., U (n) . It is known that the marginal distribution of U (i) is the Beta distribution Beta(i, n − i + 1) for i = 1, ..., n. To construct a random set for predicting an unobserved realization, denoted by U * (1) , ..., U * (n) , we consider replacing U (i) of a random draw U (1) , ..., U (n) , with an interval. The upper end point of the interval is set to be the κ (0 ≤ κ ≤ 1) quantile of the truncated distribution Beta(i, n − i + 1) restricted on the interval from U (i) to 1. The lower end point of the interval is set to be the (1 − κ) quantile of the truncated distribution Beta(i, n − i + 1) restricted on the interval [0,
Formally, in terms of a DSM we define the focal element as
with P i (V i ) = pBeta(V i , i, n − i + 1) for i = 1, ..., n. The functions pBeta(., i, n − i + 1) and qBeta(., i, n − i + 1) stand for the CDF of Beta(i, n − i + 1) and the inverse CDF of Beta(i, n − i + 1). We define a measure on the focal element space as follows:
.., V n ) and κ are independent, 2. V = (V 1 , ..., V n ) follows the distribution of the ordered uniform (U (1) , ..., U (n) ), and
This results in a class of DSMs indexed by w n .
The use of a distribution for κ is motivated by the fact that in the general n case, there does not exist a constant κ ∈ [0, 1] that produces a satisfactory DSM for balancing credibility and efficiency. The particular choice of the class of distributions for κ is based on both mathematical simplicity and flexibility for finding a satisfactory MB model. For the n = 1 case, we take w 1 = 0, which gives the MB model discussed in Section 4.1. To find the MB, let S be the random set and let
for a realization (U * (1) , ..., U * (n) ) of (U (1) , ..., U (n) ). Given a prespecified value α, e.g., α = 0.05, the MB is obtained by finding a solution w n to Pr q *
For any fixed w n , q * wn can be simulated using Monte Carlo methods. Since the long-run frequency distribution of q * wn in (4.3) is monotone in w n , the solution w n to (4.4) can be obtained via the Stochastic Approximation (SA) algorithm of Robbins and Monro (1951) . For example, with fixed α = 0.05, the SA algorithm based simulated q * wn produces the following results for a set of values of n n 1 2 3 5 10 100 1,000 10,000 w n 0 0.33 0.57 0.98 1.8 6.6 13.7 22
It appears that w n for n in the range from 3 to 100 is approximately linear in (ln n) 2 . This approximation is used in Section 5.2 for estimating the number of outliers in the many normal means problem.
A class of predictive DSMs for unordered uniforms
For predicting an unobserved realization (U * 1 , ..., U * n ) from U ([0, 1] n ), we make use of the random set proposed in Section 4.2 for U *
(
where P n is the set of the n! permutations of (1, ..., n). Mathematically, we need to specify a DSM on the space P n . In this paper, we consider the vacuous DSM. That is, we take the DSM with P n as the single focal element. More precisely, the focal element space consists of the single subset P n and the measure is defined by the DS-mass function: m(P n ) = 1. Care must be taken, however, in computing (p, q, r) for certain assertions because there is one and only one unknown assignment permutation. The use of this DSM is illustrated in Section 5.2 for the multiple testing example.
More Examples
In this section, we consider two examples: (1) inference about N (µ, 1) with unknown µ from an observed sample X 1 , ..., X n and (2) inference about N (µ i , 1) with unknown µ i for i = 1, ..., n from observed X 1 , ..., X n , where X i s are independent with X i ∼ N (µ i , 1).
The N (µ, 1) model
Suppose that the normal model N (µ, 1) with unknown mean µ is to be fit to the observed sample X 1 , ..., X n . We consider the a-equation
where Φ −1 (.) stands for the inverse of the CDF of the standard normal distribution. The n = 1 case was considered in Section 4. For the general n case, the permutation for assigning ordered values (U (1) , ..., U (n) ) to (U 1 , ..., U n ) is known and is determined by the order of the observed data X 1 , ..., X n . More precisely, we have
where X 1 , ..., X n are ordered in their magnitude into X (1) < X (2) < ... < X (n) .
The MB posterior of µ is obtained by combining evidence in (5.1) with (U (1) , ..., U (n) ) following the DSM in Section 4.2 for ordered uniforms. Mathematically, combining evidence in (5.1) amounts to computing
where A i (V i , w) and B i (V i , w) are defined in (4.1) and (4.2). The cases with a µ > b µ are known as conflict cases and need to be ruled out, following the logic of DS combination (Dempster, 2008) . The remaining cases provide the random
as the evidence µ ∈ [a µ , b µ ] for µ. Note that it is easy to verify that for each
is an increasing sequence. We note that in practice an extremely large fraction of conflict cases indicates that the postulated model does not fit the data. Further investigation along this line would lead to new methods for checking goodness-of-fit.
For a numerical example, we present a simulation study for the case of n = 10. In the simulation study, we generated 1,000 data sets, each consists of a sample n = 10 from N (0, 1). For each data set, the CDFs of the lower end a µ and the upper end b µ of the random interval [a µ , b µ ] were obtained based on 10,000 independent Monte Carlo draws. The CDF of b µ , denoted by F bµ (µ 0 ), is the posterior probability p for the truth of the assertion {µ ≤ µ 0 }. The CDF of a µ , denoted by F aµ (µ 0 ), is the posterior plausibility p + r for the truth of the assertion {µ ≤ µ 0 }. Hence, 1−F aµ (µ 0 ) is the probability q = 1−p−r against the truth of the assertion {µ ≤ µ 0 }, while r = F aµ (µ 0 ) − F bµ (µ 0 ) is the probability of "don't know". (c) we see that the MB analysis is more robust to (potential) outliers than the Bayesian analysis. It can also be seen from Figure 5 .1 that the MB CDFs depend on the sample data as a whole, while the Bayesian CDF depends on the data only through the sample mean (for its location) and the sample size n (for its variance). This indicates a nice feature of MB analysis, namely, it results in a type of conditional inference (Wallace, 1959 , Kiefer, 1977 , and Berger, 2003 , which depends on additional information in the data beyond the sufficient statistics. For example, it is widely accepted among frequentist statisticians that, in many statistical problems, sampling probabilities should be calculated conditionally on the value of an appropriate ancillary statistic; see Walley (2002 and references therein) . It remains to be seen whether WB inference leads to better understanding of conditional inference. To compare MB results with frequentist confidence intervals, we constructed the MB credible interval for a nominal level 1 − α
by taking l α/2 to be the α/2 quantile of F aµ (.), the CDF of the lower end point of the random interval, and taking u α/2 to be the 1−α/2 quantile of F bµ (.), the CDF of the upper end point of the random interval. The MB credible intervals that have the actual long-run frequency coverage of 95% among the 1,000 simulated data are those computed with the nominal level 1 − α = 82%. The use of the actual long-run frequency coverage rather than the nominal coverage is based on the thought that because MB is situation-specific, a confidence coefficient has no meaning. Thus, the interval constructed here based on MB posterior probabilities serves as an alternative way of constructing confidence intervals. Figure 5 .2 shows 101 of the 1,000 confidence/credible intervals. The average interval length of the MB credible intervals is comparable to that of the frequentist confidence intervals.
The fact that the length of the MB credible interval depends on the observed data pattern clearly shows the conditional inference feature of MB analysis.
The many normal means problem
We consider the many normal means problem X i ind ∼ N (µ i , 1) with unknown means µ i for i = 1, ..., n. This is a very important practical problem, which we call the second fundamental problem of practical statistics, while referring the first fundamental problem to the binomial population mean problem (Pearson, 1920 ).
Here we use it as an illustrative example by taking n = 100 and considering the sequence of assertions, concerning the number of "outliers" (µ i = 0):
for K = 1, 2, ..., where |S| denotes the number of elements in the set S.
To compute our (p, q, r) probabilities for A K in (5.3), we use the following a-equation
One can use the predictive random set for U 1 , ..., U n , as discussed in Section 4. The needed technique is essentially the same as what is described below for an alternative MB method, where we are concerned with a predictive DSM for a subset of U 1 , ..., U n . The purpose here is to show that MB analysis can be conducted at assertion level, that is, the MB analysis can be tailored for the assertion(s) of interest.
For each assertion A K , we will have no evidence for the truth of the assertion because the posterior probability for each µ i being zero is zero. Thus, we have p = 0 for all A K , K = 1, 2, ... Note that the assertion A K can be stated as "there are at most K − 1 outliers" in µ 1 , ..., µ n . To compute the probability against the truth of A K for each K = 1, 2, ..., we need only to find evidence that there does not exist U i 1 , ..., U i n−K , a sample n − K from U (0, 1), such that
Computationally, one way of doing this is to first generate a predictive random set for the ordered (n − K), instead of n, uniforms and then to assign each of
in such a way that the number of matched interval-data assignments is maximized. The required maximization is due to the fact that we use the vacuous DSM for the unknown assignment permutation discussed in Section 4.3. The cases with unmatched intervals provide evidence against the truth of A K . This matching problem is a simple version of the maximum assignment problem. It can be solved straightforwardly by assigning [a j , b j ] to the smallest X i values that satisfy
in the order j = 1, ..., n − K. This method creates the greedy matching and is known as Glover's algorithm (Glover, 1967; Soares and Stefanes, 2007) .
To see the performance, we conducted a simulation study. To create the observed data, four types of µ i s were considered: (a) µ i = 0 for all i = 1, ..., 100; (b) 90 of µ i are zero and the other 10 were generated from 2 + Expo(1); (c) 90 of µ i are zero and the other 10 were generated from 4 + Expo(1); and (d) 90 of µ i are zero and the other 10 were generated from 6 + Expo(1). Figure 5 .3: MB results for detecting outliers in 100 normal means. Each plot shows the posterior probability Pr (there are at least K outliers) given each of 10 replicates of simulated data based on generated normal means µ 1 , ..., µ 100 having (a) no outliers; (b) 10 outliers generated from 2 + Expo(1); (c) 10 outliers generated from 4 + Expo(1); and (d) 10 outliers generated from 6 + Expo(1). The case in (b) with large probabilities in the displayed range corresponds to a simulated data having all the observed data values larger than -1.00.
Each case was replicated 10 times, resulting in 10 sequences of probabilities for the truth of the assertion that there are at least K outliers for K = 1, 2, .... These probabilities are shown in Figure 5 .3 (a)-(d). The fact that the probabilities for the assertion that there is at least one outlier are spread quite evenly along the vertical axis in Figure 5 .3 (a) shows that MB posterior probabilities are approximately frequency-calibrated. This can also be seen to some extent in Figure 5 .3 (d). Case (b) is relatively difficult for detecting outliers because intuitively, observed values in the interval, say, from 1 to 2, would cause problems. Even in this difficult case, using both large probability values and their sequential changes/differences would result in a good estimate of the number of outliers, considering that the probabilities are intended to be used only for a kind of lower bound on the number of outliers. Case (b) contains an interesting simulated data set, where all the observed values in the data set are above -1.00. For this data set, the large probability values are quite large and decrease very slowly in the entire displayed range for K from 1 to 21. This is not surprising because the MB analysis here tries to find a subset of data that consists of as many as possible data values under the condition that the subset looks like a typical sample from N (0, 1). This phenomenon can be seen for some cases in Figure 5 .3 (c) and (d),
where MB would do a pretty good job for detecting outliers.
We note that finding the number of "outliers" is important in the context of multiple testing. The MB method provides a new approach to inference about the fraction of µ i that are zero (see, e.g., Efron (2004) ). We are currently investigating MB methods, including MB approaches to statistical deconvolution, for multiple testing.
Conclusion
For credible and efficient fiducial and DS inference, in this paper we considered WBs and proposed the MB method. The examples show that MB has the potential to resolve challenging statistical inference problems. We presented the work in the DS framework and viewed MB as a modification of conventional DS.
Nevertheless, WB and MB-DSMs are indeed pure DSMs, where the conditional DSMs for X given θ in the context of a-equation (1.1) should be interpreted as for situation-specific prediction rather than for data-generation. We plan to make more detailed argument for this view elsewhere. Also, more research is needed on defining efficient classes of weak beliefs from which MB at both belief level and assertion level can be sought. and discussions, especially on BDSMs in Section 2 and WBs in Section 3. We thank Diane Lambert, Earl Lawrence, David James, Ryan Martin, Jose Pinheiro, Donald B. Rubin, Glenn Shafer, and Scott Vander Wiel for helpful discussions, and the editorial board and two referees for constructive suggestions and critical comments on earlier versions of the paper. Jianchun Zhang's research is supported by Purdue Research Foundation.
